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Alongside articles, the journal also publishes a number of ‘fifth columns’ –  short and provocative 
pieces that might either frame/reference a number of the articles in the volume or raise issues 
relating to the scope and terms of musicology as a discipline. These ‘fifth columns’ should not be 
seen as ‘editorials’.
Fifth Column: 
On the radical in musicology 
Ian Biddle
Newcastle University
I might have begun this inaugural ‘fifth column’ with the objection that the title of 
this journal, ‘radical musicology’, is really little more than a hopeless oxymoron. 
Certainly, for many of us who work in this field, the idea that musicology, that 
cranky, idiosyncratic and sometimes self-absorbed discipline, might constitute in 
any way a ‘radical’ or even engaged practice seems some way off the mark. And 
yet, the discipline has, at various moments in its short history, nonetheless 
engaged in certain methodological and discursive intensifications that might be 
characterised as ‘radicalisations’. I’m thinking here not just of those moments 
where ‘musicology as a political act’,1 to use Philip Bohlman’s phrase, has been 
explicitly proposed or engaged – although this journal is precisely about holding 
that possibility firmly in view – but also of those moments where musicology 
sought to question the viability and solidity of its epistemological ground, sought to 
ask questions of itself that were eventually transformative. The rise of music 
analysis, the advent of ‘vergleichende Musikwissenschaft’ and its later cognate, 
ethnomusicology, the advent of music psychology, the emergence of new critical 
biographies at the turn of the last century, the inception of critical music editing, 
the rise of ‘early music’ and somewhat later the rise of popular music studies, one 
might say, are all intensifications of the academic discourse on music that can 
make some claim to the radical. 
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And yet, musicology since Guido Adler has aimed squarely at wresting the study 
of music from the amateur, from that ‘lover’ of music, the hopeless enthusiast: in 
this sense, a least, the advent of musicology was not a moment of liberation or 
radicalisation but an intense institutionalisation, a drive for a secure disciplinary 
territorialisation, professionalisation, and a systematic problematisation of what it 
sought to represent as naïve amateur ‘enjoyment’. Musicology’s complex 
relationship with enjoyment, however, is not usefully characterised simply as a 
disavowal or an elaborated Puritanism in the face of popular enthusiasm: in its 
pleasuring in its own ever more secure disciplinarity, in its pleasuring, moreover, in 
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the systematic disenfranchisement of all but the most erudite listener,2 musicology 
facilitated the confrontation of one kind of enjoyment with a subaltern enjoyment, 
an enjoyment that only rarely dared speak its name. This ‘enjoyment of the other’ 
thereby has a double meaning here: the first is precisely that which musicology 
sought to refute, the enjoyment that it sought to discipline, to banish as amateur 
enthusiasm; the second is precisely that other pleasure of musicology, an enjoying 
(consuming) of the other as its constitutive difference, the secret pleasure of the 
discipline.
Heinrich Schenker, that most reluctant of radicals, points to this surreptitious 
pleasuring in his beguiling short essay ‘Das Hören in der Musik’ [‘Listening in 
music’] from 1894: 
3
The greatest triumph, the proudest delight, in listening to a work of art is in 
raising up the ear to the same level [‘Macht’] as the eye. One need think 
only of a landscape, broad and beautiful, framed by mountains and hills, full 
of fields and meadows and woods and streams, full of all this, which nature 
creates in all its beauty and variety. And then one might climb to a place, 
where one can take in the whole landscape in a single look… In the same 
way, there is, somewhere above the artwork, a place from which one can 
see and hear from the spirit of the artwork all its pathways and goals, its 
dawdling and raging, all its variety and limitation, all its dimensions and 
relations.3
The listener is certainly here, and pleasure runs amok, but it is a certain kind of 
pleasure, a disciplinary pleasure, so to speak: the Nietzschean overtones of this 
fragment lend it its intensity, as a rage against the particular, the local, the 
piecemeal. Yet pleasure it is nonetheless, as an enjoyment precisely of that 
position, of the ‘seeing’ from above (the synaesthesia gives the clue to the excess 
here), from the place where the lofty disciplinary privilege affords the total(ising) 
glimpse. He enjoys his difference from the mundane listener, enjoys the view his 
knowledge affords him precisely because it is rare, special, on a par, even, with 
the great masters: ‘Whoever has found this place – from such places the 
composer must surely unfold his work – he can say quietly he has “heard” the 
work. But such listeners are truly rare.’4
It is precisely in this double sense that musicology is a discipline, operating 
precariously at the boundary between permission and prohibition, enjoyment and 
Law. This boundary, which musicology has always struggled to stabilise, is 
precisely where it is at its most contested. Indeed, we are all now familiar with the 
debates about ‘hidden’ and ‘explicit’ pleasures, that characterised some of the 
most striking and paradigm-shifting moments in the discipline’s history in the 90s. 
Van den Toorn’s now infamous attack on the ‘populism’ of what we used to call the 
‘New’ musicology in 1994 (exactly 100 years after Schenker’s strange and 
beautiful essay), gets right to the key operatives of the conservative position.  In a 
footnote on his chapter ‘In defense of music theory’ he takes on Lawrence Kramer 
for his neo-Puritanism: 
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Kramer assures us that, according to the new humanist or postmodernist 
creed, immediacy will not be “deconstructed” as something “spurious and 
pernicious.” “The last thing a postmodernist musicology wants to be,” he 
writes, “is a neo-Puritanism that offers to show its love for music by ceasing 
to enjoy it.” I remain skeptical nonetheless.5
So the conservative, rather than the fuddy-duddy who seeks to discipline 
enjoyment, is really a fun seeker. Or is he? In the main text, to which the above 
was a footnote, van den Toorn offers a slightly different perspective: 
My worry is that, officially installed with its own “priesthood,” the new 
subjectivity will constitute a greater imposition on the individual aesthetic 
than anything that might have emerged from positivist or formalist thought. 
So, too, in the name of passion, or the scholarly pursuit of passion, music is 
likely to be reduced to something wholly sociological, passion itself to the 
humdrum or vulgar.6
The turnabout from one passage to the other (from an anxiety about the 
disciplining of pleasure to an anxiety about ‘passion’) is not merely an incompetent 
self-contradiction, but a strategic re-alignment of enjoyment and passion: 
enjoyment is open, harmless, an easy target of these damned zealots whereas 
passion is a dangerous kind of enjoyment, a political enjoyment, a pleasure too 
far. And yet what is really at work here, it seems to me, is the quiet and genteel 
disavowal of Kramer’s most radical insight – his recognition of enjoyment as 
always already political.  
For Jacques Lacan, and Slavoj Žižek after him, enjoyment is not simply a matter of 
absolute free play or of an abandonment or ‘letting go’ of oneself to pleasure. 
Paradoxically, the injunction to ‘Enjoy’, for Lacan the superego ‘in its most 
fundamental dimension’,7 is in play with what ought to be its opposite, prohibitive 
Law, which is grounded on, or operates in, an intense dependency on its 
underside, the ‘undergrowth of enjoyment’: 
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Therein consists the opposition between Law and superego: Law is the 
agency of prohibition which regulates the distribution of enjoyment on the 
basis of a common, shared renunciation (the “symbolic castration”), 
whereas superego marks a point at which permitted enjoyment, freedom-to-
enjoy, is reversed into obligation to enjoy – which, one must add, is the 
most effective way to block access to enjoyment.8
The apparent internal contradiction in van den Toorn between enjoyment and 
passion is explained here as a symptom of the impossible ontology of enjoyment 
itself: it never quite ‘fits’ or assimilates to musicological discourse, but sticks out as 
a surplus, bringing pressure to bear on it, disturbing its structural quietude. As a 
‘political factor’, to use Žižek’s formulation, enjoyment is never merely ‘innocent’, 
never free from ideology. Whether one adopt a disciplinary approach to it, or try to 
give in to it, enjoyment always eludes a reduction to mere carnality or mere 
abstinence.  
And, just as enjoyment is always susceptible to the discipline of the political, so the 
discipline of musicology is always susceptible to ‘enjoying itself’: 
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Superego emerges where the Law – the public Law, the Law articulated in 
the public discourse – fails; at this point of failure, the public Law is 
compelled to search for support in an illegal enjoyment.9
Nowhere in Adler’s now well-known schematisation of Musikwissenschaft of 1885 
is there an explicit moratorium on enjoyment and nowhere is there a deliberate 
disciplining of the lover of music (there is no presence by negation: no ‘not
enjoyment’, no ‘not pleasure’) and yet, nowhere is the listener, or the audience, 
addressed either.10 The absent listener marks out the disciplinary limits thus: in 
order to undertake these activities, the scholar must himself (the gendering here is 
deliberate), of course, listen, but the process, which, in this schema would be 
deemed most likely to be ‘tainted’ or infected by enjoyment, is precisely that which 
is absent, or at last present only by very coded implication.  
Adler’s schema distinguishes between the various ‘specialisms’ of the field through 
the mapping of (mostly) methodological and (some) reportorial characteristics, and 
thereby emphasises the scholarly process of apprehension (‘Verstehen’) over co-
apprehension (‘Mitverstehen’). Below (fig. 1) is the schema for the first of the two 
branches of musicology, ‘historische Wissenschaft’:11
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Fig.1: Adler’s schematisation of the first branch of musicology, historical 
musicology (1885) 
In the absence of co-apprehension, of scholarly technologies for the 
understanding of how we come to enjoy, to consume or take up music, we also 
note a clear tendency to rely primarily on epistemological categories, on modalities 
of knowledge. At this moment of explicit institutionalisation, musicology focuses its 
attentions on precisely those systematic methodological approaches that hide or 
translate enjoyment into discipline. Certainly, Adler’s scheme does not explicitly 
discipline enjoyment, but, rather, operates a genteel silence about it: only when 
this public law of category and methodology breaks down (as it clearly did for van 
den Toorn) does the figure of enjoyment emerge as illegal, to use Žižek’s term, as 
contrary to the explicit logic, and yet as supporting it. The radical insight that Lacan 
helps us make here is that disciplinarity is its own kind of enjoyment. 
Radicals on the loose? 
The position of the radical within this structure of disciplinarity is not something 
that can be prejudged or theorised ahead of its incursion into the field: the radical 
indulges in its own kind of enjoyment and is, by its very nature (at least since the 
Reformation), traumatic. In modern political theory, the term radical has 
paradoxically come to be connected resolutely to the notion of radical change, to 
those individuals and those elements of the body politic committed to root-and-
branch reform and paradigmatic, even revolutionary, transformations of the social, 
cultural and political fields. I say ‘paradoxically’ since the term ‘radical’, from the 
Latin radix [‘root’], was linked in its pre-modern usage to that which was viewed as 
essential to a thing – to what, in short, was fundamental, essential, of the root; its 
usage in this manner was especially common in connection with the notion of the 
radical humour – that which was essential, in medieval and renaissance humoural 
theory, to life.12 This appeal to rootedness gives way in later usage to precisely the 
connection between fundamentals and transformation that characterises the 
modern political usage: fundamentals are now at risk of, or become susceptible to,
thorough-going transformation; they have become amenable to the influence of 
outside forces, to the hand of human agency, (understood in its ever more 
extensive, generalising and collectivised sense).13 In short, one might be so bold 
as to suggest that the transformation from the tightly-rooted to the uprootable 
traces nothing less than the rise of the modern polis, the emergence of the modern 
conception of ‘citizenship’, popular agency, and the formation of an understanding 
of ‘modern democracy’ (in all its highly-contested and problematising forms) in line 
with contemporary uses. 
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Understood in this way (as a key component, that is, of a longue durée of popular 
agency), the ‘radical’ has become a quality constitutive of most forms of global 
state-sponsored and community-based political discourse and action: indeed, one 
might argue, most forms of political democracy involve at some level, in some 
way, an exercising precisely of some kind of ‘popular’ political agency; the 
susceptibility of the institutions of democratic states to willed change is thus key to 
this modern conception of the radical – a radical citizen is one who holds the 
malleability of those institutions to be demonstrable through her or his intervention. 
What characterises this modern imagination of the radical, moreover, is a 
commitment to a transformative politics of intervention that we might characterise 
as, in some sense, a romantic formation;14 to be radical, it seems, is to believe 
that one’s actions can and will have effect, that change is in one’s hands and that 
one’s subjective energies can, under the right conditions, constitute a cause.
9
And yet, in an age that has so fundamentally deterritorialised the radical and the 
various forms of political radicalism (especially those forms of radicalism nurtured 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) as to have rendered them rather 
innocuous (comical, even), to declare oneself a radical now is to strike a slightly 
ridiculous pose or, at best, to brandish a now much maligned and denigrated 
shibboleth. Indeed, if ever there were a claim that set one community against 
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another, it is the claim to the position of the ‘radical’, and if ever there were a 
community anxious about political commitment, belief and anything that smacks of 
the deadly ‘ideology’, it is the community of Anglophone music scholars. This, 
precisely, is what sociolinguists understand by ‘shibboleth’, a term, concept or idea 
that distinguishes one community from another (or separates one group from 
another within a community) by virtue of the term’s local differentiated articulations 
or usages within each group or subgroup. The reduction of the radical to 
shibboleth, then, is the consequence, as is often the case with shibboleths, of the 
desire to sort out friends from enemies, insiders from outsiders (to reference 
conservative jurist Carl Schmidt’s framework for understanding the operation of 
political discourse).15 In this context, the radical, as shibboleth, is also an agent 
nonetheless: as ‘romantic’ agent, admittedly, it has a more fulsome operative 
territory than as mere shibboleth, but in both instances the logic of the radical 
remains the same – to distinguish between different kinds of attachment to political 
formations. Arguably, then, the radical is itself constitutive of political engagement, 
of political participation, agency, and, let us be clear, it is therefore also about 
contention – without some kind of (however distributed) agency there can be no 
politics and without there being a bearing witness to the operation of that agency 
on the political, the political as such cannot hold itself together.  
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have called for a rethinking of the liberal 
conception of political discourse (as a quest for consensus) in favour of a 
conception of the political as an arena in which agents contend, contest, and 
confront each other; this is an arena that does not provide for a smoothing over of 
difficult differences in the interest of the serene operation of the institutions of 
governance, nor does its primary function lie in seeking out any consensus.16 This 
kind of politics refuses that liberal quiet. What is striking in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
work is its commitment to a notion of political discourse as ‘agonistic’, as 
constituted by differences: 
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One of the key theses of agonistic pluralism is that, far from jeopardizing 
democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence. 
Modern democracy’s specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of 
conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order. 
Breaking with the symbolic representation of society as an organic body – 
which was characteristic of the holist mode of social organization – a 
democratic society acknowledges the pluralism of values, the 
“disenchantment of the world” diagnosed by Max Weber and the 
unavoidable conflicts that it entails.17
It is this ‘disenchantment’ which, for Mouffe, must be held in view since to seek to 
represent the political discourse as simply rational, as in some sense ‘in balance’, 
would be to foreclose the political altogether in favour of an emptied-out pseudo-
discursive territory in which all statements accord with each other, or in which 
contestation is limited to (apparently) symmetrical structural oppositions. And it is 
precisely the radical, the agent that sticks out, that cannot be assimilated to any 
such pseudo-discursive structure and that insists on the political as an 
impassioned arena of contestation. We might thereby conceive of the radical as 
that which exceeds the political discourse, that which constantly gestures to a kind 
of ‘beyond’ or supplement by making demands which draw attention to the 
structural flaws of political consensus. In short, the radical paradoxically holds the 
political together (guarantees its viability) by continuously breaking it apart 
(guaranteeing its non-viability).
It is, of course, a very particular logic of demand that structures this vision of the 
political, where the border between request and demand is constantly being 
redrawn. Laclau has even suggested it may be possible to conceive of the 
demand as that which precedes the emergence of the political actor. Here, dealing 
with the emergence of ‘the people’, for example, Laclau lays out his striking 
reversal of classical political theory: 
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… a demand which, satisfied or not, remains isolated [is] a democratic 
demand. A plurality of demands which, through their equivalential 
articulation, constitute a broader social subjectivity we will call popular
demands – they start, at a very incipient level, to constitute the ‘people’ as a 
potential historical actor. Here we have, in embryo, a populist configuration. 
We already have two clear preconditions of populism: (1) the formation of 
an internal antagonistic frontier separating the ‘people’ from power; and (2) 
an equivalential articulation of demands making the emergence of the 
‘people’ possible.18
What is interesting for me in this reversal is precisely the positioning of the 
demand before the constituting of the actor and, more importantly, the manner in 
which it thereby constructs the actor as an effect of the discourse of demands.19
What also interests me here is the way in which the political actor nonetheless is 
able to retroactively fill the primary demand with content – literally to populate it. In 
preceding the actor, the demand is not its cause, but, rather, actor and demand 
together constitute together a singular political instance. 
* * * * * 
In recent years, so-called ‘activist’ or radical music scholarship has come to be 
viewed by many as damaged, or marked by an over-simplified and intense 
commitment to a certain reductive ‘ideological’ trajectory. The scholarship of the 
late 1980s and the 1990s that questioned and critiqued the dominance of 
formalist-analytical and archival-empirical tendencies in musicology, for example, 
were accused of an over-commitment to a ‘populist’ discourse, or even accused, 
as we have seen, of a covert ‘Puritanism’: these scholars, so the conservative 
critique went, attached themselves too readily to their ideological positions, 
overidentified with the transformative potential of their work, or, worst of all, 
overburdened musicology with an array of inappropriately complex and alien 
theoretical resources that had no business contaminating the pursuit of musical 
meaning (ideology critique, psychoanalysis, feminism, sociology, anthropology, 
semiotics, avant-garde continental philosophy etc.). In short, they displayed a 
scholarly excess. They lacked moderation. There was something unseemly in their 
protests. Yet this journal wants to hold the possibility precisely of this kind of 
unseemliness firmly in view, not because its editors or the editorial Collective and 
Board have a shared or prejudicial view of what it might mean to be ‘radical’, nor 
because they wish to silence or close down any branch of musicology, but 
because without an agonistic forum in which actors and agents feel able to openly 
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debate the terms on which we should engage music, musicology will remain 
hopelessly enthralled to its own pleasures. Indeed, as Laclau and Mouffe have 
suggested, agonism provides a channel for the expression of differences such that 
there should be no need for recourse to other less ethical actions outside the 
arena: whilst constraining musicology to a genteel consensus by no means leads 
to the violence that Laclau and Mouffe identify as the outcome of such 
enforcement, we can imagine it leading (if it hasn’t already) to a situation in which 
a set of quasi-tribal alliances governs appointments, acceptances for publication, 
promotion and the doling out of the benefits of disciplinary validation. There is no 
guarantee that the agonism I propose can guarantee this will not be (or is not 
already) the case, but I am persuaded by Laclau and Mouffe in this at least: an 
enforced genteel consensus is no way to generate strong and thoughtful 
discourse.
The homepage of this journal makes the case for the unseemly questioning of 
musicology’s ground in the following terms:  
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… responding to a perception that the projects going under the names of 
‘new’ and ‘critical’ musicology have been succeeded by a certain 
disciplinary retrenchment or even counter-reaction, we aim to encourage 
work which explicitly or implicitly interrogates existing paradigms, and which 
acknowledges that musicological work will always have a political 
dimension.
I cannot speak for the Collective or the Board, and I make no claims to knowing 
what this dimension will look like in advance; nor would the journal seek to limit 
content to any particular ideological trajectory. However, journals inevitably 
develop a characteristic tone of their own and there will inevitably emerge a certain 
style, a certain emphasis and trajectory in the articles we publish. For the moment, 
it is my hope that we can continue to encourage and publish work of the highest 
quality that fundamentally questions those elements of musicological discourse 
that Gramscians have come to call ‘common sense’, that is, those reductions of 
discourse to the unquestionable of that which can and should always be 
questioned.
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